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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
-V.-
ONE LOT OF REAL PROPERTY 
(Theodore and Christine McKinley), 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20020290-SC 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) 
(Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(1) the State is dissatisfied with the appellant's 
statement of issues and sets forth the following issues on appeal. 
QUESTION ONE 
Was the court below correct in concluding that the controlling statute in this 
forfeiture action is U.C.A. § 58-37-13, where the cause of action for forfeiture, including 
the service of search warrants, a cash transaction for sale of the property, and statements 
from Appellant himself that the property was sold, all occurred in February of 2001? 
Standard of Review: This question includes both a finding of fact and conclusion 
of law. A trial court's conclusions of law which involve both the application and 
interpretation of a statute are reviewed by the appellate court for correctness and no 
deference is given to the trial court's decisions. Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 
#1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993). In 
addition a question of fact is reviewed by an appellate court under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of So. Utah, 920 P.2d 629, 635 (Utah 1995). 
QUESTION TWO 
Is the State required to physically seize real property by some adverse means 
before the cause of action can be said to have accrued, or alternatively, is a cause of 
action for forfeiture determined by an arbitrary future filing date, rather than the date of 
the violation giving rise to the forfeiture action? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law which involve both the 
application and interpretation of a statute are reviewed by the appellate court for 
correctness and no deference is given to the trial court's decisions. Beynon v. St. George-
Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 
1993). 
? 
QUESTION THREE 
Was the court below correct in concluding that the State acted in good faith where 
it relied on information from both the police and the Appellant himself that the property 
was purchased with drug proceeds, and the Appellant explicitly stated that his sole 
remaining interest in the property was a $10,000 payment on the contract of sale? 
Standard of Review: This question includes both a finding of fact and conclusion 
of law. A trial court's conclusions of law which involve both the application and 
interpretation of a statute are reviewed by the appellate court for correctness and no 
deference is given to the trial court's decisions. Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 
#1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993). In 
addition a question of fact is reviewed by an appellate court under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of So. Utah, 920 P.2d 629, 635 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules appear in full text in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND OUTCOME 
Appellee State of Utah filed an action for forfeiture under U.C.A. § 58-37-13 et 
seq. on March 30, 2001 (R. 1-4), alleging that certain properties represented proceeds of 
violations of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, to include one lot of real property the 
Appellant had sold to a Louis Acevedo and Herman Drain (R. 293). On April 30, 2001, 
the State voluntarily moved to dismiss the real lot of property from the civil action 
without litigating on its merits (R. 143). An order of dismissal was entered pursuant 
thereto on May 8, 2001 (R. 146). On October 31, 2001, Appellant made a motion for 
attorney fees under U.C.A § 24-1-11, which came into effect on March 29, 2001, and 
under U.C.A. § 78-27-56 (R. 236). Appellants' motion for attorney fees was denied on 
January 16, 2002, following a series of memoranda addressing the issues, and oral 
argument held on January 7, 2002 (R. 321-322). Following motions to alter or amend, the 
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, were entered on March 4, 2001 (R. 373-
380). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about February 9, 2001, subsequent to an extensive investigation into 
methamphetamine production and distribution (R. 292), five search warrants were served 
at various locations by the West Valley City Police Department, to include the real 
property at issue in this case (R. 294). 
Incident to that investigation, West Valley City Detectives met with Appellant 
McKinley in February of 2001. McKinley told detectives that he had sold the property in 
a cash transaction that allowed him to avoid taxes and applicable zoning laws that had 
hindered his ability to sell the land (R. 293). McKinley further stated that his sole interest 
in the property was one remaining $10,000 payment due on or before April 1, 2001 (R. 
293). The sale transaction was evidenced by a writing shown to the West Valley City 
Detectives, who informed the Appellant they would seek forfeiture of the property (R. 
293). Based upon the information offered by McKinley, coupled with the investigation 
and bill of sale, Detective McLenon believed the real property represented proceeds of 
illegal drug sales and transactions (R. 294). McKinley was not considered an active 
participant in the underlying crimes because he had disclaimed ownership of the property 
(R.294). 
In February of 2001, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 [1996] was the statute in effect 
for all forfeiture cases. On March 29, 2001 at 5:00 p.m., Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-1 et al 
became effective (R. 374). On March 30, 2001, this case was filed under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-13 [1996], the statute in effect at the time the property became subject to 
forfeiture (R. 1-4). 
On May 8, 2001, the lot of real property was voluntarily dismissed out of the 
defendant lot of property (R. 146). Entry of Judgment regarding the remaining defendant 
lot of property was entered on October 17, 2001 (R. 233-234). Appellant McKinley, 
through counsel, filed its Motion for Attorney's fees on or about October 31, 2001 under 
Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-11 and U.C.A. § 78-27-56 (R. 236). 
On January 16, 2002, following extensive briefing and oral argument by both 
parties, Third District Judge Tyrone E. Medley ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-1 et al. 
brought substantive changes to the law and could not be applied retroactively; that "the 
seizure or violation date" that gave rise to the forfeiture action occurred in February of 
2001 thus precluding attorney fees under Utah Ann. § 24-1-11; and, that the forfeiture 
was not filed in bad faith (R. 321-322). The Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, were entered on March 4, 2001 (R. 373-380). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court's decision to deny attorney fees should be affirmed because the 
basis for this cause of action accrued in February of 2001 when Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13, which does not provide for attorney fees, was the controlling statute. The Appellant 
misframes the issue by suggesting that "what constitutes a seizure" of real property is the 
determinative issue on appeal (Appellant's Brief at 8). Appellant errs. What constitutes a 
seizure does not equate with the acts that give rise to a forfeiture cause of action. Indeed, 
physical seizure of real property is frowned upon when not necessary to protect the 
government's interest pending the legal action. There is no disagreement in this case that 
a person cannot be deprived of property, real or personal, without adequate notice and 
judicial proceeding. That occurred here and is not at issue. Put differently, it is neither an 
adverse seizure of real property nor an arbitrary future filing date on property that 
determines when the forfeiture cause of action has accrued. 
Furthermore, the State acted in good faith when it filed the action based upon an 
extensive police investigation and information from the Appellant himself that he sold his 
property to known methamphetamine distributors in an under-the-table cash transaction 
evidenced by writing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE DUE TO VIOLATIONS, ACTS, AND 
INFORMATION THAT OCCURRED IN FEBRUARY OF 2001. 
This is a civil cause of action that must be controlled by the statute in effect at the 
time the action arose. Appellant improperly relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-11 to 
support his claim for attorney fees because the enactment of U.C.A. § 24-1-11 is clearly 
substantive in nature and cannot be applied retroactively, and this cause of action accrued 
in February of 2001. Under Utah law: 
A 'substantive' change, or one that affects substantive rights, may not be applied 
retroactively." Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah.Ct.App.1996). As 
stated by the court of appeals in Washington National "'Substantive law is defined 
as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties and which give rise to a cause of action." 795 P.2d at 669 (quoting Petty v. 
Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 593-94 (Utah 1948)). In contrast, procedural law merely 
"pertains to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by 
which the substantive law is determined or made effective." Id. 
Brown & Root Industrial Service v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 
675 (Utah 1997). U.C.A.. § 24-1-11 is a new statute in Utah which creates and regulates 
new rights and duties of parties in asset forfeiture actions. It is therefore substantive and 
cannot be applied retroactively. 
Because U.C.A. . § 24-1-11 cannot be applied retroactively, the trial court must 
determine when the underlying civil cause of action accrued. Under Utah law, "[t]he true 
test in determining when a cause of action arises or accrues is to establish the time when 
the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion." Valley 
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Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997)(quoting 51 Am 
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 107 (1970)). 
This cause of action accrued in February of 2001. That is when the State became 
aware that the lot of property was forfeitable through a variety of investigation, 
interviews, and service of search warrants (R. 292-294). Indeed, it was in February 2001 
that Appellant McKinley gave explicit information to investigators that he had sold his 
property in a cash transaction, that payment of $10,000 from the new owner was 
forthcoming, and was told by police the property would be forfeited (R. 293 and R. 296) 
It was this February investigation and not some arbitrary future filing date that establishes 
the time when the State could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion, 
and thus determines what statute governs proceedings in regard to the defendant lot of 
real property. Because no provision exists for attorney fees under the governing statute, 
U.C.A. § 58-37-13 etseq., attorney fees were denied. 
A similar conclusion was reached in Holt v. Young, 2001 WL 1285889 
(Tenn.Ct.App). There, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether the respondent 
in a seizure was entitled to attorney fees under a statute enacted after the date of violation 
and/or seizure of the defendant property. The Holt Court ruled that the seizure of the item 
of personal property was the date from which it would determine when the cause of 
action arose, and what statute to apply. The respondent whose vehicle had been 
voluntarily released sought attorney fees under a previously non-existing section similar 
to that which Claimant cites in this case: 
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The trial court found that section 40-33-215 was inapplicable to the seizure 
of Mr. Holts Car. We agree. ... The Tennessee Legislature added section 
40-33-215 to the forfeiture statute effective October 1, 1998. Section 40-
33-215 is not applicable to the case at bar because the seizure which 
occurred on March 18, 1996 predated the enactment of section 40-33-215. 
Section 40-33-215 may not form the basis for an action for damages 
connected with the seizure of Holt's car. 
Id. at 6. The Tennessee Court of Appeals concluded that the respondent was not entitled 
to attorney's fees because the cause of action pre-dated the attorney fee statute. This 
position was adopted by the trial court because this cause of action accrued in February 
2001, making the applicable statute Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 [1996). 
Appellant cites to a case that further establishes the State's position. In United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), the United States 
Supreme Court was asked to determine if a forfeiture of real property four and a half 
years after a search of the premises produced drugs and drug paraphernalia was timely 
commenced under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04. In holding that the forfeiture could not be 
dismissed for failure to comply with the timely commencement requirement, the United 
State Supreme Court held, that "the government filed the action in this case within the 5-
year statute of limitations and that sufficed to make it timely." Id at 65. The United 
States Supreme Court made it clear that the commencement of the statute of limitations or 
the date of the cause of action was determined from the date of the events that created the 
cause of action. In Good, that determinative date was when the search warrant was 
executed at the residence and drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. The same 
rationale applies to the case at bar. This cause of action accrued in February 2001, and 
the applicable statue is Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 [1996). 
II. PHYSICAL SEIZURE OF REAL PROPERTY IS NOT WHAT 
DETERMINES WHEN A FORFEITURE ACTION ACCRUES, AND 
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED. 
The fact that this case involves real property does not change the outcome reached 
in Point I above because a physical seizure of real property is not what accrues the cause 
of action. The Appellant raised this issue mixed with a due process argument, although 
due process was not raised at the trial court in either a memorandum or oral argument. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of raising arguments on appeal that were 
not addressed in the court below in several cases. In State v. Carter 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 
1985) the Utah Supreme Court held "Failure to raise the point [below] precludes its 
consideration here [on appeal]." Id. at 661. In a later decision the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not consider an issue, 
including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error." State v. Helmick, 9 P.3d 164, 167 (Utah 2000). 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that the issue has been raised below, the 
Appellant's argument fails. The Appellant mistakenly argued below, and argues again 
here, that a physical, adverse taking of the real property (i.e. physical seizure, fencing, 
etc.) must have occurred before the district court could find when the cause of action had 
accrued, and that the lack of such a seizure violated his due process rights. On the 
contrary, it is precisely because the State of Utah did not adversely take possession of the 
in 
real property, but did file the action within the 90-day period prescribed by statute, that 
ensured due process was not violated. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property 
explains why this course of action was proper: 
Because real property cannot abscond, the court's jurisdiction can be 
preserved without prior seizure. It is true that seizure of the res has long 
been considered a prerequisite to the initiation of in rem forfeiture 
proceedings. See Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 
80, 84, 113 S.Ct 554, 557, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992); United States v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 1105, 79 
L.Ed.2d361 (1984). ... 
But when the res is real property, rather than personal goods, the 
appropriate judicial forum may be determined without actual seizure. ... 
Nor is the ex parte seizure of real property necessary to accomplish the 
statutory purpose of § 881(a)(7). The Government's legitimate interests at 
the inception of forfeiture proceedings are to ensure that the property not be 
sold, destroyed, or used for further illegal activity prior to the forfeiture 
judgment. These legitimate interests can be secured without seizing the 
subject property. 
Good, 510 U.S. at 57 and 58. 
The Appellant has therefore misstated the pivotal issue at bar by suggesting this 
appeal is about "what constitutes a "seizure" of real, as opposed to personal, property for 
purposes of forfeiture proceedings..." (Appellant's Brief at 12). Appellant confuses 
seizure and cause of action as being one in the same. By Appellants logic, no statute of 
limitation could ever exist because the filing of a case would be equated with when a 
cause of action arose. What is more, the purpose of drastic measures such as "posting, 
barricading, or occupying the land" (Appellants Brief at 12), when used at all, are used to 
protect the interests of the government, and does not effect whether or not the property, 
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factually, is subject to forfeiture. This is not to suggest that physical seizure and 
forfeiture of property can occur without due process. Notice and an opportunity to be 
heard is required under Utah's asset forfeiture statute for both seizure and forfeiture, see 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(9), and it is disingenuous of the Appellant to suggest that this 
case would have proceeded without statutory procedures being followed. But these 
procedures do not determine when the cause of action accrued. 
As discussed above in Good, the State may seek forfeiture without taking actual 
physical control of real property, and the basis for forfeiture of real property occurs when 
the State has sufficient information to proceed in a civil cause of action seeking such 
forfeiture. This concept was further discussed in Forfeiture of $109,901 United State 
Currency, 533 N.W.2d 328 (Mich.App. 1995), where the Michigan court explained: 
The government may seize property that is "subject to forfeiture" as defined 
by statute. See M.C.L. § 333.7522; M.SA. § 14.15(7522). Whether 
something is "subject to forfeiture" is determined by reference to acts that 
occurred before the seizure. See M.C.L. § 333.7521; M.SA. § 
14.15(7521). Thus, the statute contemplates that the government's 
forfeiture interest in the property arises, at the latest, at the time the property 
is seized. 
Other sections confirm that the time of seizure is when the government's 
right of forfeiture arises. For example, M.C.L. § 333.7523(1); M.SA. § 
14.15(7523)(1) requires forfeiture proceedings to be instituted promptly 
after the seizure. Similarly, M.C.L. § 333.7525; M.SA. § 14.15(7525) 
allows summary forfeiture upon seizure of certain property. 
By contrast, the validity of competing claims of ownership is determined by 
whether the property became "subject to forfeiture" by reason of acts 
"committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent." 
(citations omitted). Because the property becomes "subject to forfeiture" 
before the seizure, this section clearly presupposes that competing 
ownership rights must exist, if at all, before the seizure. Thus, both the 
12 
validity of the government's claim and the validity of competing claims is 
determined by reference to facts occurring before the seizure. 
Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added). Applying the law, it is evident that the district 
court made the correct decision. Utah's asset forfeiture statute tracks the Michigan 
statute. It states "The following are subject to forfeiture and no property rights exist in 
them: ... (k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter ..." Utah Code Ann. 
58-37-13(2)(k). A separate subsection then states: "Property subject to forfeiture under 
this chapter may be seized..." Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(3)(a). Thus, like the Michigan 
statute, whether something is subject to forfeiture is determined by reference to acts that 
occurred before the seizure. These acts subject the property to forfeiture, but that 
determination is not necessarily linked to the act of seizure (which may or may not occur 
under a different subsection). Because the real property in this case became subject to 
forfeiture by acts occurring in and before February of 2001, the district court correctly 
applied Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 et seq. to the cause of action. 
A hypothetical further illustrates the point. Suppose on March 20, 2001, a new 
statute was going to take effect in Utah with a clause that created a "presumption of 
forfeiture against a claimant who did not have physical possession of the property being 
sought for forfeiture." In February 2001 an investigation is conducted, a search warrant is 
served, and a prior owner without physical possession of real property provides 
information that the property was recently sold to drug dealers in a cash deal. Officers 
tell the person a forfeiture will be instituted. But the State, seeing a more favorable 
statute down the road, does not adversely seize the property and puts off filing the action 
11 
until March 21, 2001. By Appellant's logic, despite the substantive nature of the change 
in the statute, and the fact that the basis for the forfeiture action clearly accrued before the 
filing date or any physical seizure, the State would be entitled to apply the newer, harsher 
statute to its benefit and the claimant's detriment. The result stands against reason and 
law and illustrates why the accrual of the cause of action, and not some arbitrary filing 
date, must determine which law is to be applied. 
Taken together, Third District Judge Medley correctly denied attorney fees. The 
acts giving rise to the forfeiture clearly predated enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-11, 
and those acts determined which statute controlled this action rather than an adverse 
seizure or some arbitrary future filing date. The district court's ruling in this regard is 
therefore in harmony with the law and should be affirmed. 
III. THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES FAILS UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 BECAUSE APPELLANT DID NOT 
PREVAIL ON THE MERITS, THIS ACTION HAD MERIT, AND IT 
WAS FILED IN GOOD FAITH. 
The Appellant's claim for attorney fees is improper under U.C.A. § 78-27-56 
because Appellant never prevailed on the merits. "A court may award attorney fees under 
section 78-27-56 and/or costs under Rule 54(d) only to a prevailing party. ... To be a 
prevailing party, a party 'must obtain at least some relief on the merits' of the party's 
claim or claims." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002) quoting Crank v. Utah Judicial 
Council 20 P.3d 307 (Utah 2002). Here the lot of property was voluntarily dismissed 
without litigation on the merits. Therefore, a claim for attorney fees under section 78-27-
56 is improper. 
Even if considered, Appellant's motion for attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56 must fail. The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following considering Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56: 
The statute contains two requirements a prevailing party must meet to 
become entitled to reasonable attorney fees. First, the court must determine 
that the action or defense to the action was without merit, and second, that it 
was not brought or asserted in good faith. 
Faust v. KAI technologies. Inc., 15 P.3d 1266, 1269 (Utah 2000). As illustrated below, 
the Appellant fails both requirements. 
A. The Forfeiture Action Had Merit. 
The forfeiture action in the instant matter was meritorious because the lot of 
property was factually subject to forfeiture. To prove a claim is "without merit," a party 
must show that the claim is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis 
in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). This action was based 
in law and fact. Utah Code Ann § 58-37-13(2) states "[t]he following are subject to 
forfeiture and no property rights exists in them:" Included are "all proceeds traceable to 
any violation of this chapter. ..." Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13(2)(k). The trial court had 
before it Affidavits of West Valley City Detective McLenon and Theodore McKinley and 
found that there was a basis for the State of Utah to seek a forfeiture of the Appellant's 
property. From the competing versions of event, the trial court found that the purchasers 
of the property "were suspects of the illegal drug distribution"; that the property "was 
sold to Louis Acevedo and Herman Drain during a cash-only deal meant to avoid tax and 
zoning laws" which Appellant now denies; and that at the time forfeiture was sought, 
is 
Appellant McKinley "disclaimed ownership of the property, aside from a $10,000 cash 
payment still owning under contract of sale" (R. 373-377). Under these facts, the 
forfeiture action was clearly not frivolous as the State had every reason to believe that the 
Appellant's property right was extinguished when he sold the property, rendering it 
proceeds of violations of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. As with any cause of 
action, private negotiations were entertained in the interests of justice and expedience,1 
but such communications do not change the fact that the property did represent proceeds 
of violations of the Utah Controlled Substances Act and was thus subject to forfeiture. 
B. The Forfeiture Action Was Asserted in Good Faith. 
The forfeiture action was asserted in good faith because the subjective intent of the 
State was to remedy violations of the Utah Controlled Substances Act as provided by law 
while furthering the interests of justice. "Finding a lack of good faith turns on subjective 
intent," Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Utah 1997) citing Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah.Ct.App.1989), and "for purposes of the statute, is 
synonymous with a finding of "bad faith,"" Id. citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d at 151-
52 (Utah 1983). Here Appellant McKinley was believed to be, and acknowledge being, 
the prior owner of property purchased by known methamphetamine dealers. Based upon 
information it received from police and Appellant himself, the property was subject to 
forfeiture. The State's intent at that point was to remove the ill-gotten property from its 
1
 Appellant includes with his appeal a private letter between the State and Appellant before the forfeiture action was 
filed. Even that communication, made in the context of negotiations, demonstrates that the Appellants were never 
considered anything more than "prior owners" of the property who were providing assistance to investigators and 
were to be treated accordingly. 
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purchaser, while treating the former owner in accordance with the assistance he was 
believed to have provided to police. Given these facts, the lower court properly 
concluded that the action was pursued in good faith and denied attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's order denying attorney fees should be affirmed because it 
correctly concluded that this cause of action accrued in February 2001 and is governed by 
U.C.A. § 58-37-13 et seq. which does not provide for attorney fees. Indeed, Appellant 
incorrectly characterized its appeal as a case of first impression about what constitutes 
seizure. Case law demonstrates, rather, that the dispositive issue is when the cause of 
action commenced by reference to the acts that subject the property to forfeiture, and that 
physical seizure of the real property is itself frowned upon when not strictly necessary. 
The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in this regard establish that the 
governing statute in this matter did not allow for attorney fees. Additionally, the findings 
of fact below demonstrate that the forfeiture action had merit and was filed in good faith, 
precluding attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
WHEREFORE, Appellee State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the Order of Denial of Appellant's Motion for Attorney Fees, entered in the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, Judge, presiding. 
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lis DATED thi  }U_ of November, 2002. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney 
Christopher G. Bown 
Deputy District Attorney 
istrict Attorney 
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class, postage pre-paid, this Ay day of [\pJ 2002, to the following interested 
parties: 
Frank D. Mylar 
MYLAR & TROST, L.L.C. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated §24-1-11 
Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-11 (2001) 
§ 24-1-11. Attorneys' fees and costs 
In any civil or criminal proceeding to forfeit seized property under this chapter, the court shall 
award a prevailing owner reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs of suit reasonably incurred by 
the owner. An owner who prevails only in part shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees 
and reasonable costs of suit related to those issues on which he prevailed. 
HISTORY: Initiative B, 2000, adopted Nov. 7, 2000. 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2001) 
§ 58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture ~ Seizure - Procedure 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in rem complaint seeking forfeiture or any criminal 
information or indictment which contains or is amended to include a demand for forfeiture of a 
defendant's in personam interest in any property which is subject to forfeiture. 
(b) "Drug distributing paraphernalia" means any property used or designed to be used in the 
illegal transportation, storage, shipping, or circulation of a controlled substance. Property is 
considered "designed to be used" for one or more of the above-listed purposes if the property has 
been altered or modified to include a feature or device which would actually promote or conceal a 
violation of this chapter. 
(c) "Drug manufacturing equipment or supplies" includes any illegally possessed controlled 
substance precursor, or any chemical, laboratory equipment, or laboratory supplies possessed with 
intent to engage in clandestine laboratory operation as defined in Section 58-37d-3. 
(d) "Interest holder" means a secured party as defined in Section 70A-9a-102, a mortgagee, 
lien creditor, or the beneficiary of a security interest or encumbrance pertaining to an interest in 
property, whose interest would be perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. A person who 
holds property for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for another, or who is not in substantial 
compliance with any statute requiring an interest in property to be recorded or reflected in public 
records in order to perfect the interest against a good faith purchaser for value, is not an interest 
holder. 
(e) "Proceeds" means property acquired directly or indirectly from, produced through, realized 
through, or caused by an act or omission and includes any property of any kind without reduction 
for expenses incurred in the acquisition, maintenance, or production of that property, or any other 
purpose. 
(f) "Resolution of criminal charges" occurs at the time a claimant who is also charged with 
violations under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d enters a plea, upon return of a jury 
verdict or court ruling in a criminal trial, or upon dismissal of the criminal charge. 
(g) "Violation of this chapter" means any conduct prohibited by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 
37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the state which would be a violation of the laws 
of the place where the conduct occurred and which would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 
37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d if the conduct had occurred in this state. 
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or 
acquired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended for use, in 
manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled 
substance in violation of this chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property described in Subsections 
(2)(a)and(2)(b); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including capsules used 
with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to administer controlled 
substances in violation of this chapter; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or 
concealment of property described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a 
common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless the owner or other person in charge 
of the conveyance was a consenting party or knew or had reason to know of the violation of this 
chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or omission 
committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an interest holder who did not 
know or have reason to know after the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did 
take place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or 
intended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled 
substance in violation of this chapter, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or 
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this chapter. An interest in property may not be 
forfeited under this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
interest holder knew, had reason to know of, or consented to the conduct which made the property 
subject to forfeiture. The burden of presenting this evidence shall be upon the state; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real property of any kind 
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, warehousing, storing, protecting, or 
manufacturing any controlled substances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real property is 
subject to the claim of an interest holder who did not know or have reason to know after the 
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the interest holder 
did not know or have reason to know of the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, 
or did not willingly consent to the conduct; and 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or manufacturing controlled 
substances, a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real property may not be 
forfeited under this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property 
within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the street value of any controlled substances 
found on the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced in 
controlled substances law enforcement may testify to establish the street value of the controlled 
substances for purposes of this subsection; 
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation to a violation of 
this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or located within the proximity of 
controlled substances or other property subject to forfeiture under this section; and 
(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a rebuttable presumption 
that all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug 
manufacturing equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of 
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are proceeds traceable to a 
violation of this chapter. The burden of proof is upon the claimant of the property to rebut this 
presumption. 
(3) (a) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any peace officer of 
this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure 
without process may be made when: 
(i) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant or an inspection under 
an administrative inspection warrant; 
(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the 
state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this chapter; 
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
(iv) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or 
intended to be used in violation of this chapter and has probable cause to believe the property will 
be damaged, intentionally diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state. 
(b) Upon the filing of a complaint, the court shall immediately issue to the seizing agency a 
warrant for seizure of any property subject to forfeiture which had been seized without a warrant in 
a manner described in this Subsection (3). 
(4) In the event of seizure under Subsection (3), forfeiture proceedings under Subsection (9) 
shall be instituted within 90 days of the seizure. The time period may by extended by the court 
having jurisdiction over the property upon notice to all claimants and interest holders and for good 
cause shown. 
(5) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in custody of the law 
enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the orders and decrees of the court or the 
official having jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or 
agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under which it was seized; 
or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in 
accordance with law. 
(6) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for 
distribution in violation of this chapter are contraband and no property right shall exist in them. All 
substances listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state may be 
retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or other preservation prior 
to disposal or destruction by the state. 
(7) All marijuana or any species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I and 
II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this chapter, or of which the 
owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths, may be seized and retained for any 
evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or other preservation prior to disposal or 
destruction by the state. Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any 
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of plants are growing or 
being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a license, is authority 
for the seizure and forfeiture of the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the court that no person is 
entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the custody of the Division of Finance. 
Disposition of all property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing agency 
be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property 
in the enforcement of controlled substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over the case shall 
award the property to the seizing agency. Each agency shall use the forfeited property for controlled 
substance law enforcement purposes only. Forfeited property or proceeds from the sale of forfeited 
property may not be used to pay any cash incentive, award, or bonus to any peace officer or 
individual acting as an agent for the agency, nor may it be used to supplant any ordinary operating 
expense of the agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs 
incurred in filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may not be 
applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defendant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, bureau, county, or 
municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific property or classes of property subject to 
forfeiture shall be given the property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney for 
legal costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the director 
of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the need for the property and the 
use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications for property submitted 
under Subsection (8)(b) and, if the seizing agency makes no application, make a determination 
based on necessity and advisability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant 
or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all 
costs to the appropriate department. The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting 
agency or agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to exceed the amount of 
the net proceeds received for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall 
be returned to the seizing agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of 
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by public bidding or as considered appropriate, 
by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the 
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his 
designated agent. 
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows: 
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a complaint shall be prepared 
by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the district attorney, or the attorney 
general, and filed in a court of record where the property was seized or is to be seized. In cases in 
which the claimant of the property is also charged as a criminal defendant, the complaint shall be 
filed in the county where the criminal charges arose, regardless of the location of the property. The 
complaint shall include: 
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture. 
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, the forfeiture shall 
proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in personam action against the defendant's interest 
in the property subject to forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but 
may acknowledge or deny interest in the property at the time of first appearance on the criminal 
charges. If a criminal information or indictment is amended to include a demand for forfeiture, the 
defendant may respond to the demand at the time of the amendment. 
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the determination of forfeiture 
shall be stayed until resolution of the criminal charges. Hearing on the forfeiture shall be before the 
court without a jury. The court may consider any evidence presented in the criminal case, and 
receive any other evidence offered by the state or the defendant. The court shall determine by a 
preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release of the property 
as it determines. 
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture action, to stay all action, 
including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for hearing on the forfeiture any time prior to trial of the 
criminal charges. Either party may move the court to enter a finding of forfeiture as to defendant's 
interest in part or all of the property, either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a finding, the 
court shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the criminal charges. Any finding of 
forfeiture entered by the court prior to resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a 
separate judgment, and any motion for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer of the forfeiture 
action may not create a separate proceeding. Upon the granting of a motion by the defendant for 
disposition, stay, severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, the defendant shall be considered to 
have waived any claim that the defendant has been twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture under this 
subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a complaint filed under this subsection. 
Following the entry of an in personam forfeiture order, or upon the filing of a petition for release 
under Subsection (9)(e), the county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general may proceed with 
a separate in rem action to resolve any other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture. 
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2)(k) shall be prepared by the county 
attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the district attorney, or by the attorney general, either in 
personam as part of a criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the property 
alleged to be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property is seized or encumbered, if the 
proceeds are located outside the state. A finding that property is the proceeds of a violation of this 
chapter does not require proof that the property is the proceeds of any particular exchange or 
transaction. Proof that property is proceeds may be shown by evidence which establishes all of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period when the conduct in 
violation of this chapter occurred or within a reasonable time after that period; and 
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than conduct in violation of the 
chapter. 
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and 
served upon all persons known to the county attorney or district attorney to have a claim in the 
property by: 
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal information or indictment; 
and 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known or to each owner 
whose right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given 
upon the records of the division, which service is considered complete even though the mail is 
refused or cannot be forwarded. The county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general shall 
make one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was 
made for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed to have an interest 
in the property. 
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or interest holder shall 
file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days after service. When property is 
seized under this chapter, any interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with 
a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having jurisdiction for release of his 
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right 
to have it released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a prosecution 
district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer the petition within 20 
days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) For civil actions in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for 
release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the 
complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim and order 
forfeiture or release of the property as the court determines. If the county attorney or district 
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evidence 
that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter an order directing the 
county attorney or district attorney to answer the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed 
within that period, the court shall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to 
receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the end of 20 days, the 
court shall set the matter for hearing. At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of 
their rights of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release 
of the property as it determines. 
(h) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the property in whole or in part, 
it shall declare the property to be forfeited. 
(i) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it 
shall order release of the property to the proper claimant. If the court determines that the property is 
subject to forfeiture and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. When the 
property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, the court shall order it sold and the 
proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal 
costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund. 
(j) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the court 
shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the property, 
against the individual or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may assess 
costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as appropriate. 
HISTORY: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch. 12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, § 2; 1990, 
ch. 304, § 1; 1991, ch. 142, § 1; 1992, ch. 121, § 2; 1993, ch. 38, § 59; 1996, ch. 198, § 31; 1996, 
ch. 294, § 2; 2000, ch. 252, § 14. 
Utah Code Annotated fc ,\X J ' 56 
I Jtah Code Ann § 78 2 ; 56 (2002) 
§ 78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if 
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was w ithom v - «t ,md n< it 
brought or asserted in t»nml Hrith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court:, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the part;! ' has filed an affidavit of impecunios".t\ ' -rioiv :! 
court; o: 
r
 court enters in ilic record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
p ons of Subset " ^ n ' 
HISTORY: L. 1981, i'
 JO , ••-% ch 92, § 1. 
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HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R 0 C E E D I N G S ] 
(The following proceedings were held telephonically.) , 
THE COURT: Okay. Are all of you still there? ! 
MF ? , : : es. ; 
MR. : : Yes. I 
TI IE CO! J R T : Wl ic > \ , a s 1:1 le f. i :s I p e r s o i I tl: l a t s p o k e ? I 
MR. MYLAR: T h i s i s Mr. M y l a r . ! 
TI IE CO! JRT: 0'- •• • 
f a i n t , s o . . . | 
MR. MYLAR: Oh, o k a y . ! 
THE COURT: Oh, that's a lot better there. ; 
MR. MYLAR: All right. I'll try to speak a little j 
louder. • ' • ; 
THE COURT: Okay. The record should reflect that \ 
1:1 IIs :i s case i Ii u i: iber 0 ] 0 9027 6 9 . Ai id 1 et me have a 11 :>f yoi i ; 
identify yourselves for the record, starting with Mr. I lylar. ' 
MR. MYI iAR: Th i i s I "I] 1: i> I a i repre s en11 ng 11: < ; :; 
McKinleys. ; 
MR. BARNARD: Brian Barnard on beh a,] f of Herman and \ 
i 
Connie Drain. ; 
MR. BOWN: Chri s Bown for the State. • 
TI IE COURT: Oka;v The record should reflect that we = 
set this time for a telephone conference call on the record for 
the sole purpose for me to render a ruling on the plaintiffs' 
motions for attorneys fees. I've had an opportunity to further 
consider all the memoranda submitted to me, as well as the case 
law cited to me by counsel as well, and I've decided to rule as 
follows, counsel. And let me say for the benefit of the record 
that I'm of the opinion that there is not a tremendous amount 
of law on this subject, and maybe we're going to create some 
here today. I don't know, but let me say this. 
First, I am going to deny the motions for attorneys 
fees as to Mr. Mylar's and Mr. Barnard's clients, and this is 
how I'm viewing the issues, counsel. First of all, I am of the 
opinion that Utah Code Annotated 24-1-1 through -11, in this 
Court's opinion, is substantive in nature and consequently — 
and the reason why it's substantive in nature is because it 
creates new rights, duties, and responsibilities. I think when 
you read the provisions as a whole, it does that, and for that 
reason it's substantive and not procedural, and in my view, 
without express language to the contrary, it cannot apply 
retroactively. 
That is the primary reason why I'm denying both 
motions, and in doing so I'm also relying — and again there's 
not a tremendous amount of law in this state on these issues — 
but in doing so I'm relying on the Holt v. Young case cited to 
me by the State, a copy of which is in the file, and the 
analysis set forth therein. 
2 
1 A n d w h i t tf,i" '"''jrnes d< >wi * 11, m , - i\ • n h s ^ l , i s 
2 ' simply this. The significant date in this Court's v b-ew is the 
3 I date of seizure or the date of ^ rj c J at:i c: i :i T1 Ie se p r o p e r t i e s a r e 
4 ' only subject to forfeiture once it is established, obviously, 
5 ! that they are proceeds or instrumentalities of conduct 
6 ' }: roh:i bi ted ui ider 58-3 7 ] 3 . So :i i I this Court/ s view, because 
7 • you have to establish violation of the law in that regard, it 
8 j i s tl le date of allegation i of v iolation, excuse me, or the 
9 l> date of seizure which is the significant date, and tl lat the 
10 :I a 1: e • : • f f :i ] :i i I :j • : f t h e f D r f e i t u r e a c t i c »i I : :i : 11: i • E :i a t B 11 I e 
i'i ' attorneys fees are incurred, neither of those dates control. 
12 ! C o n s j s t e n t w i t: 1 :i Ho I 1 \ • i" o u n g, :i !:  i s t h e d a t e o f v i o J a t i c • i i • : • r 
13 ; the date of seizure that controls. 
14 ; A n d I just ..mi unable I ^  xmiMiirlf thai 
15 | significant, even though 1 do recognize the practica.. 
i 
16 ! difference when you're talking seizure, date of violation, bi it 
17 ! more so seizure in terms of real property as argued by 
] 8 Mr. Mylar. But I sti ] ] think i t is that date of seizure, date 
19 • : • f 1:; ?ri : • ] a t i oi I d a I:e, w 1: :i :i c 1 I is signxiicant in terms o 1 rcrleiture 
2 0 i actions. And in this Court's view, 24-1-1 through -11 Is not 
2 1 ; i n t e n d * 1 i 1 jf | lv r~it rcai:1; i v e l ^  ,  m 1 " In i , " IV- itid^.n u i i I 
i 
22 | am going to deny the motions for attorneys fees. 
23 ; I just don' t f :i i i :i :i 1: si g i :i i f :i can tf a,s a r g u e d b y 
i 
24 ' Mr. Barnard, the date the attorneys fees were incurred. They 
25 ; are incurred pursuant to a forfeiture action which has a 
seizure date prior to the effective date of the statutory 
provision which allows for an award of attorneys fees. 
And that's basically it, and I'm going to ask that 
Mr. Bown prepare findings and conclusions in an order 
consistent with the manner in which I've ruled here this ; 
afternoon. j 
i 
i 
Any questions about that, Mr. Mylar? j 
MR. MYLAR: Yes. I just have a question. So with j 
respect to the McKinleys, since it's real property, your focus l 
is on the date of violation; is that correct, rather than date \ 
of seizure? I 
THE COURT: Well, I'm viewing date of seizure and ; 
date of violation as the same date, in essence, or j 
i 
substantially the same date, as opposed to your argument to me j 
that the significant date is at least the date of filing of the j 
forfeiture action, because your theory is that you can't seize j 
real property. j 
MR. MYLAR: Without filing, yeah. j 
THE COURT: Exactly. I 
MR. MYLAR: Right. And so the date of violation of -j 
i 
whose violation, then? 
THE COURT: The date of alleged violation that would j 
support a forfeiture proceeding. ! 
I 
MR. MYLAR: Okay. And that's the February - ; 
THE COURT: Correct. ! 
MR. MYLAR: - 8th? 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. BARNARD: Right. That's the date that 1:1: le searcl 1 
warrant was executed. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. MY: LAR: Okaq- And did you rule on the other 
motion on the Utah Code 7 8 dash? 
[
" • ', C O ! J R T : Yfi'ii k i m w , i i ' m 1 i „ J M M I e i p p r ^ c i a i e y o u 
raising that, but. consistent with the manner in which I've 
r i i J e d, I a m u n a b 1 e t o c o i I c 11 I d e 11 i a I 11 I e f o r f e :i t \ i r e a c t :i o i i i s 
without merit based upon the affidavits that are in the file, 
subjecting the State to attorneys fees on a theory of bad fa i th 
and lack of merit. 
MR. MYLAR: Okay. 
THE COURT1: But I a p p r e c i a t e you r a i s i n g t h a t . 
Mr. B a r n a r d , any — 
• M'F BAR! JARD: I 1 i« i - ( : : i l o t l ) i i l g . 
THE COURT: Okay . IV] 1 a w a i t r e c e i p t of t h e 
f i n d i i I g s , c c i I c ] i i s :i o i i s , a i I cli o r d e r c i I 11: i e i n c t i o r I s , T h a n 1 :: } • :) i I . 
MR. BARNARD: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. MYLAR: Thank you, y< mr Hr.nrir, 
MR. BOWN: Thank you, yout Honor. 
THE COURT: Bye. 
(Proceedings concluded at i;t? ^  m ) 
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™""HNCS OF FACT AND 
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t • ', v M 
i he abo\c nailer came before this CoirT ior decision or lu:ih:r\ 16. 2002 upo i riin^•-
•\emnei .Jim, n 
Mclvinley, on October 31, 2001 in which they filed a Motion for /utonicy., l ••* 
in support thereof Claimants Drain were represented by Brian M Rirnarc. i iaiinam \ k \ . u e \ 
was represented by Frank D. Mylai , and the State was :^- "in ••• • ' 
Bown, Deputy Salt I >ake County District Attorney. The \ snvi having received and rv.ieweu me 
memoranda submitted by eacl i pai ty and 1 ita < 'ii :ig heard < : J al ai gi u I iieiits hereby ei itei s its Findii iigis 
of Fact and Conc lus ions of I .aw. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant lot of property was seized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ^ 58-37-13 et. seq 
(1953 as amended) on February 9, 2001. 
2. On March 28, 2001, the State prepared a Verified Complaint and Notice of Intent seeking 
forfeiture of certain property, including one lot of real property located at 1357 West Crystal 
Avenue and ten thousand dollars, United States currency. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 et seq. (1953 as amended) wras the only applicable law at the 
time the defendant lot of property was seized and the only applicable law at the time of the 
violation. 
4. On March 29, 2001 at 5:00 PM, Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-1 et seq. took effect. 
5. The complaint was filed on March 30, 2001 in the Third District Court. 
6. The State did not file a Lis Pendens against the property located at 1357 West Crystal 
Avenue. 
7. The West Valley Police Department seized the defendant lot of property, and sought 
forfeiture of the property, based upon an extensive investigation into illegal Methamphelamine 
production and distribution. 
8. Louis Acevedo and Herman Drain were suspects of the illegal drug distribution. 
9. During that investigation, Detectives with the West Valley City Police Department 
became aware, through statements by Theodore McKinley, and documents, that the property 
located at 1357 West Crystal Avenue was sold to Louis Acevedo and Herman Drain during a 
cash-only deal meant to avoid tax and zoning laws. Theodore McKinley now denies those 
statements were made. 
10. Y. 
statements ol I h e ^ U ' e ^ k k ; ; e . \ ^•U;J:". r : u tk '• -\\ p r o p e r l->eakv ai ^"7 
( a y stal < - e< ' " i rue as | >i o ce edi: ; oi illegal di ug ti ansactioi is. 
11. • .tlie\ ( r.j Police v>uev t.-'cM-av <»! the pioperty, I heodore 
1 /IcKii i. . n J l i , 1 , . , j w ^ 1 ( , ; . ; n i .-. she property, asuk urn. . i ^ • - • cash payment rs\}\ oving 
under the contract of sale. 
12 T~ the extent that Theodore McKinley had sold the property, as he originally claimed, he 
1
 vas l. i '!t red dii ectly in i < <T 1 • • d in i tl i * i lai ::( ) t i c s d i s l I i t I iti :; -i I i mi l g . 
- \ i*A ' i f ;i mformatio:, p?.*\)._k„ h\ l lvod. •<* McKinley, documents, and the 
. . . ,;
 MMC reason in \ <\ ,, shat property located at 1357 West 
Crystal Avenue, which had been purchased in ai i acknowledged cash deal, represented the 
proceed:, t»f illegal drug trafficking, and was thi;^ forfeitable .ind^i applicable • Tiah lav 
14. ^iici * . !. - V l < 
property the Mak lued i \i<»:ii<n m Disms.^ the proper! :«»! w. I,I-MU> reuMmv ^ ie j 
1
 "iil'ii"1 I Ill ii I i1, P'Miilen', .Hid Hi. inn, .iblt ptshii",1 il Lid l.il t n, .mil inanUaiiied wild Iheodore 
McKinley, and his counsel. 
I hi loi id real property was dismissed i>ut ol the dclendant lei of property by order of 
this ( 'nun ^ ^Uw X. 200!. 
.* eii Wiwu.^ iiki d'.'Lars was dismissed out of the defendant lot of property on the State's 
m o i j o n by order oi this Court. 
*
n
 ^laimant Herman and Corme Uram 'lied a Waiver to any clain i or interest in the 
3 
18. Rntry of Judgment regarding the remaining defendant lot of property was entered on 
October 17. 2001. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-1 et seq. cannot be applied retroactively 
because the Utah Property Protection Act creates new rights and duties that are substantive in 
nature because those rights and duties are not available under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. 
2. The Court finds the controlling statute is determined by the date of seizure or date of 
violation and not the date of filing the complaint or when attorney fees were incurred. As such, 
February 9, 2001 is the date of seizure or date of violation and the controlling statute is Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). 
3. The Court makes these determinations based on Holt v. Younsz, et aU 2001 WL 1285880 
(Slip Copy, Oct. 25, 2001) where the Tennessee Court of Appeals denied an attorney's 
application for fees under a previously non-existing section. The application was denied because 
the seizure occurred prior to the enactment of a statute making attorney fees available. 
4. In addition, the Court found that the forfeiture action had merit and was brought in good 
faith. Therefore, the attorney fees claimed by Claimant McKinley under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56 are denied. 
4 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
That the Motion for Attorney Fees filed by the Claimants in (his case be. and the same Ls 
hereby DENIED. 
Ll 
DATED this __/_ day of 
Approved as to form: 
O - ' U / ^ 
: , 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
l/)(\A^l) / ^ 
rTYRONE E. MEDLEY 
[•RANK D. MYLAR 
Dated this day of _, 2002 
S &r 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Dated this^D day of AsOuAM osu _, 2002 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, with Order, were hand-delivered / mailed, postage pre-paid, to the 
defendant, this Q^ day oi January, 2002, addressed as follows: 
Brian M. Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic 
Attorney for Herman and Connie Drain 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Frank D. Mylar 
Mylar & Trost, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Theodore H. and Christine McKinley 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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